Extraordinary Claims FOLIO I

“If the evidence was obtained in a verifiable, repeatable, scientific manner and actually does tend to prove the claim, the evidence is ordinary and persuasive.”

I enjoy a good conspiracy theory now and then but am seldom ever convinced by one. I also tend to like so-called pseudo-science but always make sure to seriously consider all sides of a debate. (Now I’ve set up every future critic for out-of-context quotations with those two sentences. Shame on you all for deliberately distorting my words!) One phrase skeptics love to use as an automatic refrain is, “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”. That’s probably the biggest load of b.s. any skeptic will ever say. First, there’s no such thing as extraordinary evidence. All evidence is ordinary. Evidence of an extraordinary claim may prove something extraordinary, but the evidence itself cannot be extraordinary. Evidence for the existence of the proton has the same nature as evidence for the existence of ghosts (if such evidence existed). The logical, rational, scientific method for determining the evidential nature of evidence is the same regardless of the claim being made. Furthermore, saying that extraordinary claims require evidence that is more (extra) evidential than the “ordinary” evidence that “ordinary” claims require sets up a double standard anathema to the scientific method. If phenomenon A is posited to occur because of hypothesis B and hypothesis C, B and C are judged by the same set of standards, the same scientific method, regardless of what A is claimed to be by B and C and what evidence on which B and C rely.

Perhaps the skeptics are not referring to the evidential nature of the evidence. If “extraordinary” is meant to apply to the persuasive power of the evidence, what then? Once evidence is determined to actually be evidence, its persuasiveness can then be evaluated.

Consider another laboratory where the evaluation of evidence is crucial: a court of law. Here there are three levels of evidentiary persuasion: probable cause, preponderance of the evidence, and reasonable doubt. Testimonial claims are put into evidence along with physical items. These two constitute the body of evidence from which conclusions are to be drawn. Evidence that merely suggests a specific conclusion and begs for further investigation is on the first level, that of probable cause. When the police think the current body of evidence is sufficient to warrant a deeper look (and after a judge agrees with them!), they will take the next step and study more.

Civil cases are generally tried by the second level, the preponderance of the evidence. When all the evidence, that of the plaintiff and the defendant, is reviewed, the preponderance of the evidence, the large majority of it, should determine the outcome of the case. This implies that some evidence may point to alternate or even conflicting conclusions. That doesn’t matter. If a preponderance of the evidence points to one conclusion, that is the conclusion to be drawn. If the evidence seems to go in many different directions, without a specific answer rising to the level of preponderance, then no conclusion can be drawn at all.

Finally, criminal cases require evidence to be conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt. Here again, there is an implication that some evidence may not contribute and may even refute the ultimate conclusion. As long as this evidence fails to meet the reasonable doubt threshold, the conclusion remains. If, however, some evidence goes beyond weak doubt and creates at least reasonable doubt, then the whole case must fail.

The judicial system is hardly a fair comparison for the scientific method, but the example remains an illustrative one. Are skeptics suggesting that extraordinary claims require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that ordinary claims can merely be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence? If the phrase does indeed refer to the persuasive nature of the evidence, then skeptics are still creating a double standard that has no place in the scientific method. The level of persuasiveness that evidence for the source of the sun’s energy has should be the same as the evidence for the source of telepathy. The extraordinary nature of a claim has no real bearing on what will persuade a scientist of its believability. If the evidence was obtained in a verifiable, repeatable, scientific manner and actually does tend to prove the claim, the evidence is ordinary and persuasive. Skeptics should be saying that evidence for extraordinary claims often fails to live up to the ordinary standards of conventional science. By falling back on the b.s. claim that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”, skeptics themselves are making an extraordinary claim — let’s bastardize the rules of the scientific method to handicap claims made by people, or about things, that we don’t like or have a bias against. Their evidence for such an extraordinary claim is almost always non-existent or weak and inconclusive at best.

So where does that leave us? I’d be happy with this simple reformulation: “All claims require extraordinary evidence.” After all, isn’t “proof” itself extraordinary? In a universe of potentialities, conclusive proof is a kind of miracle — and if you can find it, consider yourself lucky. Why? Because I’ll be there with a scalpel and a microscope to make sure you’re not trying to pull a fast one.